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Notes
Efficient Proximate Cause:
Is California Headed for a Katrina-Scale
Disaster in the Same Leaky Boat?
Jacqueline Young*
The threat of natural disaster looms each year over many states in the U.S. Although
major disasters are, in that sense, predictable, they nevertheless strike without warning.
The private insurance industry has proven incapable of absorbing the risk. Adding to
the problem is the fact that the law, in many states, allows insurance companies to skirt
around disaster coverage by inserting anti-concurrent causation (“ACC”) clauses into
their property insurance policies. Even in states where the law appears to bar such
clauses, state programs aimed at increasing disaster insurance have failed to yield
sufficient coverage to support the total amount in claims that would be produced
following another Katrina-scale event. The extensive privation following Hurricane
Katrina is proof-positive that America is not yet equipped to deal with large-scale
natural catastrophe. Unfortunately, while the federal government can and does
becomes the de facto “insurance plan” for all disaster-prone states, its response to past
episodes has been ad hoc, at best.
This Note examines the concurrent causation question and takes a close look at the
courts’ troubling treatment of ACC language following Hurricane Katrina. It goes on
to contrast the stat of the law in the Gulf region with that of California, arguing that
while California seems to have established a bright-line rule barring ACC clauses,
recent decisions have brought the integrity of this rule into question. While California’s
approach to the concurrent causation question could produce a workable solution for
other disaster-prone states to observe, the California courts must first revitalize the rule
barring ACC clauses, and the state must develop a solution to encourage more
homeowners to purchase catastrophe insurance. Finally, the Note proposes a twopronged solution, advocating both a judicial response, as well as the reintroduction of
the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. By enacting the Homewoners’ Defense Act, the
federal government can take a proactive, instead of reactive, approach to natural
disaster relief.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011. I would like to
thank Professor Leo Martinez for his patience and guidance throughout this process. I would also like
to thank Sara Tosdal and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their hard work and camaraderie.
This Note is dedicated to my husband Eric Young, who has been a stalwart companion throughout law
school, and to our family for all the love and support.
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Introduction
Hurricane Katrina caught the entire country off guard. After the
waters receded, a so-called “second storm” erupted in the courts and in
1
the media. Katrina exposed significant weaknesses in insurance
causation jurisprudence in the Gulf States and serves as an unfortunate
warning to other disaster-prone states. By comparison, California seems
prepared for a major catastrophe, defined for these purposes as a 2502
year earthquake event. In fact, California’s plan might be considered a

1. David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Policy Language in
Hurricane Katrina Cases and Beyond, in New Appleman on Insurance: Current Critical Issues in
Insurance Law 43, 46, 64 (2007).
2. Approaches to Mitigating and Managing Natural Catastrophe Risk: H.R. 2555, The
Homeowners’ Defense Act: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2555 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty.
Opportunity and the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 111 Cong. 12–14 (2010) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Glenn Pomeroy, Chief Exec.
Officer, Cal. Earthquake Auth.); Barbara Bowers, Funding the Inevitable, Best’s Rev., Feb. 2005, at
21, 24.
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workable option for other disaster-prone states—an example to follow.
But California homeowners are not as secure as they appear. As only
twelve-to-thirteen percent of California homeowners have purchased the
earthquake insurance coverage they need to protect their homes from
3
catastrophic loss, the danger of a catastrophic earthquake to
homeowners is readily apparent. This Note traces California’s approach
to concurrent causation, arguing that it may be exemplary with added
judicial and legislative support. This Note seeks to answer: How can
California avoid a massive federal bailout and the arresting results of a
Katrina-scale disaster?
Part I will give a brief background on first-party property insurance
policies as relates to the causation question, the efficient proximate cause
doctrine, and anti-concurrent clauses. Part II will take a closer look at the
legal maelstrom that followed Katrina and will juxtapose it with
California’s approach to causation, revealing that while it has been often
presumed that California draws bright-line rules on the concurrent
causation question, recent case law suggests that the bright line is fading.
Part II will further argue that California homeowners, even those with
homeowner’s insurance, are exposed to a significant amount of
uninsured risk following a major earthquake.
Finally, Part III will attempt to solve these problems by proposing a
multilayered solution. At the judicial level, the California courts should
strictly curtail the effect of recent decisions that undermine California’s
approach to concurrent causation. At the legislative level, representatives
should reintroduce and Congress should adopt the Homeowners’
4
Defense Act of 2009 (“HDA”), a federal disaster relief solution that had
5
been under consideration in the previous term. This approach may well
be a workable example for other disaster-prone states to follow.

3. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 13; see also Bowers, supra note 2.
4. H.R. 2555 [111th]: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2555 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Homeowners’ Defense Act of
2010]. Although the HDA was introduced in 2009, it remained under consideration throughout 2010
and is sometimes referred to as the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010. See, e.g., id. Because many
sources refer to it by its 2009 title, and for the purposes of consistency, I will refer to it only as the
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. At the time this Note went to print, the HAD had not yet been
reintroduced in Congress’s 112th Term, see id, and although this Note argues that it ought to be
reintroduced, the solution this Note proposes is not dependent upon the HDA. The larger goal is to
urge a federal disaster insurance scheme, and while the HDA is the most promising option currently
available, other similarly well-conceived federal schemes would be equally applicable.
5. H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009).
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I. The Tangled Web of Insurance Causation
6
In contrast to named-peril policies, all-risk policies cover all losses
to a property unless the cause of the loss is expressly excluded by the
7
policy terms. While the determination of whether coverage applies to a
loss resulting from single or multiple causes is typically straightforward,
problems arise when a loss results from multiple causes, one of which is
excluded under the policy. Suppose, for example, a policy covers rain
damage but not mudslide. What happens when a home is destroyed by a
mudslide caused by heavy rain? Is the mudslide the culprit, or is the rain?
What about when two independent but simultaneous causes destroy
property, such as a plane crash occurring at the same instant as a
mudslide?
A. The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
The prevailing approach for analyzing causation issues in first-party
property insurance coverage cases has been the efficient proximate cause
8
(“EPC”) doctrine. Under this doctrine, recovery is generally permitted
“for a loss caused by a combination of a covered risk and an excluded
risk only if the covered risk was the efficient proximate cause of the
9
loss.” Depending upon the jurisdiction, the EPC might be defined as the
10
“predominant” or most important cause in the chain of events, or
11
alternatively, as the “prime” or “moving” cause of the loss: the cause
12
that “set the chain of events in motion.” There are nearly as many
interpretations of the doctrine as there are jurisdictions to apply it, and
13
the courts have utterly failed to reach a consensus. This lack of
uniformity leaves insurer and insured alike in an untoward state of
14
uncertainty. As a result, at least three states, including Florida,

6. A named-peril, or “specified-risk,” policy is one that covers loss to the named property only if
the loss resulted from any of the specifically identified risks in the policy. Robert H. Jerry, II &
Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 391 (4th ed. 2007); Roy C. McCullough,
Property Insurance, 1963 Ins. L.J. 75, 84.
7. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 6.
8. At least thirty-five states employ some version of the EPC doctrine in first-party property
cases. Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen, Concurrent Causation Versus Efficient Proximate Cause in
First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 36 Brief 32, 33, 35–39 (Winter 2007). For an
interesting discussion on the history and development of the doctrine, see Julie A. Passa, Comment,
Insurance Law—Property Insurance: Adopting the Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine, But Saying No
to Contracting Out of It, 79 N.D. L. Rev. 561, 564–72 (2003).
9. 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 101:55 (3d ed. 2005).
10. See, e.g., Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 707 (Cal. 1989).
11. See, e.g., id. at 708.
12. 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:45.
13. Id. § 101:43.
14. Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s
Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2008); see
also Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property
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Minnesota, and Wisconsin, have expressly rejected the doctrine, and
insurers have incorporated “anti-concurrent cause” language into their
15
policies to replace the EPC analysis.
Complicating matters further, the doctrine applies in situations
16
where multiple causes occur in a causal chain, but it does not apply in
situations where completely independent causes simultaneously produce
17
an indivisible loss, as in the airplane/mudslide example above. At
common law, where two independent, concurrent causes act to produce a
loss, the insurer need only cover the part of the damage proven to have
18
resulted from the covered causes. The common law approach is
unsatisfying, because it may be difficult to distinguish which damage
resulted from a covered cause in a particular case, and the insured may
not receive the full amount of coverage for which they bargained and
paid premiums.
A small number of jurisdictions have dealt with this problem by
19
adopting a more liberal approach: the concurrent causation doctrine.
20
This approach applies a “but for” analysis similar to that in tort law.
Under the concurrent causation doctrine, a loss would be wholly covered
if it “would not have occurred but for the contribution of a covered”
21
peril. In other words, the loss is covered as long as at least one cause,
whether independent or dependent, meaningfully contributed to the loss
22
and was a covered peril.
B. Anti-Concurrent Cause Clause Language
In order to shift the causation analysis in their favor, insurers have
recently developed anti-concurrent cause (“ACC”) clauses that attempt
to override the EPC doctrine, to strengthen the control of the contract
language, and to prevent coverage for claims not anticipated when the
23
polices were created. Developments in the California courts, in cases
24
such as Sabella v. Wisler, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Insurers, 20 Forum 385, 388–89 (1985) (explaining that the decisions of the California courts, in
particular, have caused a great deal of uncertainty for insurers, as they have used the efficient
proximate cause doctrine to create “new ‘causes’ of loss never contemplated by property insurance
policy drafters”).
15. Lavitt, supra note 14, at 16–17 & n.73.
16. 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:55.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 101:49.
19. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35–39 (listing seven states as employing a concurrent
causation analysis and two states as “uncertain”).
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 33–34.
23. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 55.
24. 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
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v. Partridge, and Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., prompted
the new language. These opinions broadened the scope of coverage far
27
past what policy drafters had intended. The primary problem was that,
unlike small-scale, individual losses that could be anticipated using the
28
“law of large numbers,” large-scale catastrophic losses—caused by, for
example, hurricane, flood, or earthquake—“are difficult for insurers to
handle. . . . With this kind of loss, insurers lose the benefit of certainty
and predictability in actuarial calculations, and face potential losses that
29
may possibly exceed their resources.” As a result, catastrophic losses
have been excluded from coverage in typical homeowner’s policies for
30
quite some time. The California cases threatened that safety net, and
insurers feared that the courts would refuse to respect the exclusionary
31
language of their policies, finding coverage beyond the insurers’ intent.
Because the EPC analysis is merely a “default rule” in many
jurisdictions, approximately twenty states have allowed insurers to
contract around it, replacing it with ACC policy language intended to
override the analysis, or at least to eliminate certain unfavorable
32
outcomes. However, because of the potential for harsh results, four
33
states have refused to give effect to ACC clause language. Notably,
34
California has historically been considered one of those states. In the
states that do give ACC clauses effect, a typical clause drafted by the
Insurance Services Office (“ISO”) might read:
1. We do not cover loss to any property resulting directly or indirectly
from any of the following. Such a loss is excluded even if another peril
or event contributed concurrently or in any sequence to cause the loss.
....
(b) Water or damage caused by water-borne material. Loss
resulting from water or water-borne material damage described
below is not covered even if other perils contributed, directly or
indirectly to cause the loss. Water and water-borne material
damages means:

25. 514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
26. 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989); Bragg, supra note 14, at 388–89.
27. Bragg, supra note 14, at 388–89.
28. See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 53 (“[W]hen large numbers of independent losses can be
measured, the average loss becomes relatively easy to calculate, or in other words, there is great
statistical confidence that any one actual loss will not deviate from the overall loss calculation to a
degree that it places insurers’ financial solvency in jeopardy.”).
29. Id. at 53–54 (footnote omitted); see Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle, Uncertain
Business: Risk, Insurance, and the Limits of Knowledge 180–84 (2004) (describing the difficulties
in collecting reliable data on earthquakes and the subjectivity of any data that may be collected).
30. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 54.
31. Id. at 59–60 (citing Bragg, supra note 14).
32. Id. at 57–58.
33. See Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8 (listing California, North Dakota, Washington, and West
Virginia as having refused to implement the policy language).
34. Id. But see discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that this refusal may be wavering in California).
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(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body
35
of water, spray from these, whether or not driven by wind.

The aim of this clause is, ostensibly, to remove the possibility that
the insurer will be required to cover any water damage whatsoever, even
if the EPC of the damage was some other covered force, say wind. But
the danger of this drafting lies in the word “concurrently.” Courts could
interpret the term “concurrently” in this context to mean that no loss
shall be covered so long as water was a contributing force when any
damage occurred. In fact, in Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., Judge Senter interpreted the clause in this fashion and proceeded to
36
strike it down as ambiguous, explaining that, read literally, such
phrasing would bar recovery for massive wind damage where even
37
nominal water damage occurred at or near the same time.
Some ACC clauses are even broader and more restrictive of
coverage than the ISO language above. Compare that language with the
following ACC clause developed by State Farm:
2. We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of
the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other
causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event
to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event occurs suddenly or
gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural
or external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of these.

....
c. Water Damage, meaning
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, tsunami, seiche,
overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, all
38
whether driven by wind or not . . . .

This language may be seen as the broadest example of ACC
39
language, as it applies a “but for” analysis to causation. The “but for”
analysis completely overrides the EPC doctrine: Recovery for a loss is
barred so long as an excluded cause was a necessary element in the chain
of events leading to the loss, regardless of whether the excluded cause

35. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688–89 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff’d but
criticized by 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007); see Tim Ryles, “Anticoncurrent Causation” Refined by
Mississippi Supreme Court, IRMI.com, http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2010/ryles04-personal-linesinsurance.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
36. Id. at 693. Note that although Judge Senter’s reasoning on this point was later criticized by the
Fifth Circuit, see Leonard, 499 F.3d at 430, it nevertheless serves as a cautionary example of how ACC
language may appear ambiguous.
37. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
38. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2007).
39. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 63–64.
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was the initiating cause, the immediately-preceding cause, or something
40
in between.

II. Catastrophe in California and the Coastal States: Is Anyone
Prepared?
Part I provided a general background on the efficient proximate
cause doctrine and anti-concurrent cause language. Part II will briefly
focus on the state of the EPC doctrine and the role of ACC language in
post-Katrina litigation. Using Hurricane Katrina as a snapshot, I will
then contrast these results with the current state of California law,
exposing potential pitfalls.
A. In the Aftermath of Katrina
Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast in August 2005,
41
killing approximately 1600 people and causing $135 billion in damage.
But the storm was just the beginning; the insurance industry immediately
began implementing tactics to limit its exposure, denying coverage in
many cases by claiming that the losses were unrelated to wind—a
covered cause in standard homeowner’s policies—and were caused by
42
water—an excluded cause in standard homeowner’s policies. Some
companies even resorted to fraud in an attempt to limit payouts, coercing
engineers to “re-evaluate” damage to homes when initial reports
43
revealed damage from covered causes. By 2007, the Louisiana
Department of Insurance estimated it had received over 9000 consumer
complaints and requests for aid in resolving benefits disputes with
44
insurance companies. Insurance claims were valued at approximately
45
$60 billion by 2006.
What gave the insurance companies such security in denying claims?
Arguably, they were able to take advantage of the hopelessly confused
46
state of the law regarding the EPC doctrine in the coastal states.
Insurers of property damaged by Katrina could invoke the ACC clauses
47
in their standard homeowner’s policies in an attempt to deny coverage.

40. Id.
41. Am. Ass’n for Justice, Pattern of Greed 2007: How Insurance Companies Put Profits
Over Policyholders 3 (2007).
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 5–6.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Spencer M. Taylor, Insuring Against the Natural Catastrophe After Katrina, 20 Nat.
Resources & Env’t 26, 26 (2006).
46. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 31–32 (suggesting that while the “ever-shifting and sometimes
nonsensical judgments” addressing concurrent causation have created confusion for policyholders and
insurers alike, insurers have been able to “push the envelope,” because they have the distinct
advantage of being able to afford to wait out judicial trends).
47. Rhonda D. Orin, First-Party Coverage for Catastrophic Risks: Part I—Personal Lines, in
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It stands to reason that unlike homeowners, who were desperate to
rebuild their lives, the insurance industry had little to lose and everything
to gain by stalling. Insurers had the luxury of waiting to see what color
smoke would rise out of the judicial chimney. Inconsistency and
uncertainty in the law thus demonstrably leads to significant hardships,
the brunt of which falls on insureds’ shoulders in times of crisis.
1. Mississippi: The Smoke Keeps Changing Colors
The seesawing of court judgments in Katrina litigation has been
stunning. Cases from the Mississippi courts addressing ACC clauses are
particularly illustrative. At the outset, the federal courts were compelled
to examine the issue without guidance from the Mississippi Supreme
48
Court, which did not weigh in until 2009. The complications began with
two opposing lines of authority in Mississippi regarding whether the EPC
49
doctrine had even been adopted. Incredibly, despite the absence of a
definitive agreement on this fundamental element, the federal courts had
no trouble issuing decisions on whether ACC clauses could be used to
50
circumvent the doctrine.
First, in Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Tuepkers’
home was completely destroyed during Katrina, allegedly through a
51
combination of wind, rain, and storm surge. State Farm denied their
52
claim, citing the water damage exclusion in their policy. The policy also
incorporated State Farm’s broad “but for” ACC language, excluding all
53
loss “which would not have occurred in the absence of” water damage.
Judge Senter, hearing State Farm’s motion to dismiss in the district court,
found that any damage directly attributable to water (including storm
54
surge) was excluded under the policy. Conversely, any damage caused
55
by wind or wind-born objects was covered. In response to State Farm’s
attempt to use the ACC clause to deny coverage for wind losses that
would not have occurred “but for” water damage, Judge Senter held that
Insurance Coverage 2007, at 89, 93 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 758,
2007).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 67–77.
49. Compare Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss. 1972) (explaining that the
question of proximate cause is one of fact for the jury, and that a showing “that wind was the
proximate or efficient cause of the loss” will suffice), with Rhoden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 32 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 911 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (“Mississippi courts have not specifically adopted the efficient
proximate cause doctrine . . . .”).
50. See Lavitt, supra note 14, at 18–20, 22 (explaining that although two opposing lines of
authority had emerged in Mississippi, in the Tuepker case, Judge Senter simply ignored Rhoden and
assumed, under Grace, that Mississippi had adopted the EPC doctrine).
51. No. 1:05CV559 LTS-JMR, 2006 WL 1442489, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006).
52. Id.
53. See supra text accompanying note 38.
54. Tuepker, 2006 WL 1442489, at *3.
55. Id.
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the clause was ambiguous and unenforceable; so long as the plaintiffs
could prove their loss was proximately caused by wind, such loss would
56
be covered.
In Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., involving litigation
57
of the narrower ISO version of ACC clause language, the Leonards’
home had not been completely destroyed by Katrina, but had sustained
58
an estimated $130,000 in damage. At the district court level, Judge
Senter found that, other than $1200 worth of wind damage, Nationwide
had met its burden of proving that the bulk of the damage had been
59
caused by water, an excluded cause under the policy. With regards to an
ACC clause in the Leonard’s homeowner’s policy, Judge Senter again
found the language ambiguous and unenforceable when read in
conjunction with the coverage grant for wind, explaining that when read
literally, the terms would exclude any damage where even de minimis
60
concurrent water damage was involved.
On appeal in both cases, the Fifth Circuit changed course on the
ACC clause issue. Hearing Leonard first, the court found, “Contrary to
the district court’s ruling, Nationwide’s ACC clause is not ambiguous,
nor does Mississippi law preempt the causation regime the clause applies
61
62
to hurricane claims.” In an “Erie guess,” the Fifth Circuit read
Mississippi case law to indicate that the EPC doctrine was the default
63
rule, but that Mississippi law did not forbid the use of ACC clauses to
64
circumvent that rule. A few months later, the Fifth Circuit found in
Tuepker that the broader language of State Farm’s ACC clause was no
more ambiguous in conjunction with the other clauses in the policy than
65
was the ACC clause at issue in Leonard. Relying on its decision in
Leonard, the court held in Tuepker that the ACC clause was enforceable
66
and had effectively overridden the EPC doctrine.
Finally, in Corban v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, the
67
Mississippi Supreme Court weighed in on the subject. There, the
68
Corbans’ home had been damaged to the estimated tune of $1,607,926.
After sending an engineer to review the damage, United States
56. Id. at *5.
57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
58. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689–90 (S.D. Miss. 2006), aff’d but
criticized by 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007); see also supra text accompanying note 35.
59. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
60. Id. at 694.
61. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 431.
63. Id. at 431–32.
64. Id. at 436.
65. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2007).
66. Id. at 356.
67. 20 So. 3d 601, 617–18 (Miss. 2009).
68. Id. at 606.
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Automobile Association paid out $83,903.77 for wind damage and
$350,000 under a separate flood policy, leaving $1,174,022.23 in claims
69
unpaid. Predictably, it denied the remaining claimed amount under the
70
water damage exclusion in the homeowner’s policy. Even more
predictably, the homeowner’s policy included the following ACC clause
to water damage: “We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly
by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other
71
cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”
The court proceeded to reject the lower court’s application of the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis, explaining that ACC clauses would only apply in the
72
event that wind and water causes were “truly ‘concurrent.’” In other
words, the language would only be triggered when “wind and flood
simultaneously converg[e] and operat[e] in conjunction to damage the
73
property,” thereby creating an “‘indivisible’ loss.” According to the
court, this was not the case in Corban, where wind and water had acted
74
independently. Therefore, if wind loss occurred first and water loss
followed, the insured must still be covered for any loss proven caused by
75
wind. Similarly, if water loss occurred first and wind loss after, the
76
insured is covered for wind loss proven beyond the water loss. Notably,
the court admitted that under this assessment, the outcome would
77
depend upon which party has the burden of proof.
As is clear from this parade of case law, courts have had difficulty
applying concurrent causation analyses and ACC clauses. With no
78
consensus, both insurers and insureds alike suffer. Unfortunately, it is
often the insured who bears the heaviest burden, as the insurance
companies have the luxury of waiting to pay out claims until they are
79
forced to do so by a ponderous legal system—a rare outcome indeed.
Such inequity leads to inevitable public outcry. Particularly in the
wake of the damage and litigation spawned by Katrina, ACC clauses
were attacked as contrary to public policy and as attempts to strip

69. Id. at 606–07.
70. Id. at 606.
71. Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted).
72. Id. at 618.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 616–17.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 618–19.
78. See, e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 957, 959–60, 979–81 (2010); Lavitt, supra note 14, at 32–33; Banks McDowell,
Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 Conn. L. Rev. 569, 585 (1988).
79. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (explaining that after disaster strikes, insurers
have every incentive to deny claims until a court declares that coverage existed, and that insureds
suffer in the interim, as they often cannot begin to rebuild their lives until their claims are paid).
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insureds of coverage for which they had dutifully paid premiums.
Against this tide, some scholars deem these concerns to be widely
81
inflated. They argue that ACC language should not have come into the
equation at all in many Katrina cases, as wind and water were two
82
separate, nonconcurrent forces causing distinct damage to many homes.
With the exception, perhaps, of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the
courts have misapplied ACC language as a result of widespread
83
misunderstanding of concurrent causation. In any event, scholars opine,
ACC clause language is likely to remain in insurance policies as “its
fundamental underpinnings are contracts, and the reason-to-be of
84
contracts is to provide predictable results.”
Whether or not ACC clause language was properly questioned in
the Katrina cases, this commentary magnifies the larger issue: Courts
frequently apply EPC and concurrent causation analyses erratically,
leaving insurers and insureds forever guessing. But, as I will argue,
California’s approach to the concurrent causation analysis can provide a
solution to these problems.
2. In the Absence of Insurance
Without insurance companies, who foots the bill in the wake of a
catastrophic event? In short, the federal and state governments do. After
Katrina, the federal government dispatched the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), along with a massive federal bailout
85
amounting to upwards of $50 billion by 2008. Unfortunately, most ad
86
hoc federal aid programs are inefficient at best, and even federal aid
could not restore the status quo. Despite FEMA’s efforts to pick up the
slack, insurance companies began doubling and tripling insurance rates,
and some outright refused to issue new property insurance policies in the
87
coastal region.

80. See Inquiry into Insurance Claims Payment Processes in the Gulf Coast After the 2005
Hurricane: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 110th Cong. 10–15 (2007) (testimony of Jim Hood, Att’y Gen. of Miss.); Gene Taylor,
Hurricane Katrina Special Edition: Federal Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 Miss. L.J. 783, 784–90
(2008).
81. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 83–84.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 84.
85. FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery 3 Years Later, FEMA (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.fema.gov/news/
newsrelease.fema?id=45545.
86. See Jonathan Orszag & Doug Fontaine, An Economic Assessment of the Homeowners’
Defense Act of 2009 1 (2009); Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46; Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Spread Risk with
National Disaster Fund, St. Petersburg Times (Sept. 7, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/
essays/spread-risk-with-national-disaster-fund/798581.
87. See, e.g., Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33892, Post-Katrina Insurance Issues
Surrounding Water Damage Exclusions in Homeowners’ Insurance Policies 3 (2007); Taylor,
supra note 80, at 788; Kathy Chu, Insurance Costs Become 3rd Storm, USA Today, Apr. 3, 2007, at
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The Mississippi legislature responded to the problem by utilizing a
88
“Wind Pool”—property insurance of last resort for those in need. The
Pool purchases reinsurance from the global market at costly rates,
requiring 398% and 268% premium increases on residential and
89
commercial property policies respectively. For a brief period, federal
bailout money was allocated to help relieve the exorbitant costs of the
90
91
Pool. However, this was only a temporary solution, and aside from
92
sponsoring bills calling for insurance reform and federal regulation, it
remains to be seen how the Gulf Coast states will respond to the threat
of Katrina-like events in the future.
Unfortunately, the insurance industry pullout following Katrina was
unsurprising. The same sequence of events followed Hurricane Andrew
in Florida in 1993. Both the insurance and reinsurance markets collapsed,
and many insurers who did not go bankrupt simply abandoned the
93
market. Thus, the Florida legislature created the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund (“FHCF”), which has been successful in some respects
94
but is significantly overexposed. For example, in 2008, the Florida State
Senate released a report “indicat[ing] that the FHCF’s potential shortfall
for 2009—that is, the difference between liquidity resources and
95
potential obligations—could be as large as $19 billion.” As will be
explained in greater detail, a prophylactic federal response to
catastrophe insurance is the ultimate solution under these circumstances.

A1.
88. Taylor, supra note 80, at 788–89.
89. Id. at 789.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 789–90 (calling for support for two such bills, including the Insurance Industry
Competition Act (H.R. 1081) and the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act (H.R. 3121));
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, H.R. 3355, 110th Cong. (2007) (modified and reintroduced as
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009, H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009)).
93. Adrian Sainz, Ten Years After Hurricane Andrew, Effects Are Still Felt, Sun-Sentinel, Aug.
18, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl-1992-ap-mainstory,0,7290462.story.
94. See Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 14–15; Bowers, supra note 2, at 21–22; Obama,
supra note 86.
95. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 15 & n.22 (“The FHCF relies on bonding authority as it
builds up reserves to meet its obligations. The recognized potential shortfall is a product of the current
economic environment and lack of available capital, combined with an expansion of the FHCF.”); see
also Obama, supra note 86 (“To shore [the FHCF] up, Floridians—already facing a budget shortfall—
are paying Warren Buffet a quarter of a billion dollars just for the option to borrow money if disaster
strikes. And even then, the Cat Fund wouldn’t have enough to cover its estimated $28-billion in
exposure should a major hurricane hit.”).
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B. The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in California:
Has the Golden State Achieved the Perfect Balance?
In many ways, California has been driving the EPC doctrine
discussion. As previously discussed, the California courts’ broadening of
the doctrine did much to foster the uncertainty that led insurers to draft
96
ACC policy language in the first place. An overview of the pertinent
California cases and statutes is necessary to understand the progression
of the doctrine.
Unlike many other states, the EPC doctrine is actually codified in
97
California Insurance Code sections 530 and 532. A strict reading of the
statutory language in each of these sections, however, reveals that they
seem to conflict with one another. Section 530 reads:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the
proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract
may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss
98
of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.

By contrast, section 532 dictates that “[i]f a peril is specially excepted in a
contract of insurance and there is a loss which would not have occurred
but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though the
99
immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted.” The
“but for” language in section 532 directly conflicts with section 530’s
notion of proximate cause, because under section 532, a peril would be
excluded if it were a “but for” cause of the loss, even if the “immediate
cause” of the loss was a covered peril. Given this confusion, in a case
involving multiple causes where at least one is covered and one is
excluded, which should win?
The California courts faced exactly this question in a series of cases
100
beginning with Sabella v. Wisler in 1963. In Sabella, the plaintiffs had
purchased an all-risk homeowner’s insurance policy with National Union
101
Fire Insurance Company. Their policy excluded “loss . . . by . . . settling,
cracking, shrinkage, or expansion of pavements, foundations, walls,
102
floors, or ceilings; unless loss by . . . collapse of building ensues. . . .”
Unfortunately, by 1959, the home had incurred a great deal of
subsidence damage, sinking over seven inches in one area; although the
foundations and walls had cracked, the home was left standing and was

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See supra Part I.B.
Cal. Ins. Code §§ 530, 532 (West 2005).
Id. § 530.
Id. § 532 (emphasis added).
377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963).
Id. at 891.
Id. at 891–92.
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deemed “inhabitable.” The trial court estimated the loss of value at
104
approximately $8000.
At first glance, this appears to be a clear case of subsidence loss
excluded under the policy; however, the Sabellas argued that under
section 530, the loss should be covered as the subsidence itself had been
proximately caused by a leaky sewer pipe, negligently installed by the
105
contractor (negligence was covered under the policy). The insurer
responded that under section 532, the loss should be excluded because
106
the damage would not have occurred “but for” the settling. Attempting
to reconcile the two sections, the California Supreme Court explained
that section 532 could not be read in such a way as to nullify section
107
530. The “but for” language in section 532 necessarily corresponds to
the proximate cause, so that when the EPC of a loss is excluded under
108
the policy, the loss will not be covered. The language of “immediate
cause of the loss” corresponds only to the cause that was “immediate in
109
time to the occurrence of the damage.” Therefore, the court held, the
loss must be attributed to the “efficient cause,” the cause that set the
110
other events or causes in motion. Here, the EPC of the loss was
determined to be the negligence of the contractor, and coverage
111
applied.
After Sabella, the California courts hit a stumbling block with State
112
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Partridge. Partridge presented a
very different situation: one involving third-party liability coverage—as
opposed to first-party property coverage—where two independent
causes acted concurrently to bring about a single loss. The defendant had
filed down the trigger on his pistol in order to create a “hair trigger”—
one negligent act—and then had injured a passenger in his car as he
attempted to shoot jackrabbits from the driver-side window while
113
driving—a second, distinct negligent act. The court held that under
third-party liability coverage, where there are concurrent proximate
causes of a single loss, coverage applies “whenever an insured risk
114
constitutes simply a concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.” In

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id at 892.
Id.
Id. at 892, 895.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id. at 896–97.
Id.
Id. at 895.
Id.
514 P.2d 123 (Cal. 1973).
Id. at 125–27.
Id. at 130.
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other words, the court adopted a concurrent causation approach in place
of the EPC doctrine for this scenario. Thus, as long as one of the
concurrent causes of the loss was a covered peril, the entire loss would be
covered by the policy.
Inevitably, the insured-friendly ruling began to cause confusion. The
California appellate courts began to use the Partridge concurrent
causation analysis instead of Sabella’s EPC analysis in first-party
property cases in order to grant full coverage where one of the
115
concurrent causes of the loss was covered. As a result, in 1989, the
California Supreme Court took up Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
116
Co. to correct the confusion. In Garvey, the plaintiffs had moved into a
home in the mid-seventies and had purchased an all-risk property policy
from State Farm that excluded loss caused “by . . . settling, cracking,
shrinkage, bulging or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations, walls,
117
floors, roofs or ceilings . . . .” A year later, the Garveys discovered
damage to the walls from an addition that had begun to pull away from
118
the home. As in Sabella, the Garveys argued that the loss was covered
because it had been caused by negligence on the part of the contractor
119
who built the addition. State Farm argued that the loss was caused by
120
earth movement and was therefore excluded. The trial court, relying on
Partridge, held that because negligence was a concurrent proximate
cause of the loss, the Garveys were entitled to a directed verdict on that
121
issue.
Again applying sections 530 and 532, the California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Partridge analysis was inappropriate for firstparty property coverage cases and should only be applied in third-party
122
liability coverage cases. The court pointed out that “because a covered
peril usually can be asserted to exist somewhere in the chain of causation
in cases involving multiple causes, applying the Partridge approach to
coverage in first-party cases effectively nullifies policy exclusions in ‘all
123
risk’ homeowner’s property loss policies.” Instead, Sabella’s EPC

115. E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287, 294 (Ct. App. 1985); Premier Ins. Co. v.
Welch, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983); see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551,
554–55 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Partridge to find that the insured’s loss was covered because thirdparty negligence was a cause of the loss, despite also finding that the EPC of the loss was flooding, an
excluded cause under the policy); see also Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 704–05
(Cal. 1989).
116. 770 P.2d at 704–05.
117. Id. at 705.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 706.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 705.
123. Id.
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analysis is appropriate for first-party property cases. Furthermore, the
EPC is the “predominating” cause, not necessarily the “triggering” cause
125
of the loss. The Garvey court did, however, leave open the possibility
of a Partridge-like concurrent causation analysis that might apply to firstparty property losses in the event that two truly independent causes
simultaneously produce an indivisible loss, such as in the earthquake and
airplane crash example; in such a case, a Sabella analysis may not be
126
helpful as it may be impossible to tell which was the EPC. But the
Garvey facts presented a “classic Sabella situation,” and the question
whether negligence or earth movement was the EPC was a matter for a
127
jury to decide.
1. The Current State of Garvey and Anti-Concurrent Clauses
From the foregoing, it appears that California courts have
developed bright-line rules applicable to the causation question. If the
case involves third-party liability coverage, concurrent causation analysis
applies. If it involves first-party property coverage, EPC analysis
generally applies. But these rules fostered concern within the insurance
128
industry. Cases such as Sabella, Safeco Insurance Co. v. Motte, Safeco
129
Insurance Co. of America v. Guyton, and Premier Insurance Co. v.
130
Welch, among others, represented a trend toward allowing coverage
based on negligence for losses that seemed excluded by the contractual
131
terms of the policy. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which any loss
might be attributed to some negligence or human error. Thus, these cases
created what was considered to be a new and unanticipated cause of loss,
making it much more difficult for insurers to control the scope of
132
coverage through contractual terms alone.
As a result, the industry launched a two-pronged attack on the
courts’ expansive reading of the EPC doctrine. They lobbied the
California legislature for relief, particularly in the area of earthquake
133
insurance, and attempted to add restrictive ACC language to their

124. Id.
125. Id. at 708.
126. Id. at 713 n.9.
127. Id. at 714–15.
128. No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July 1984).
129. 692 F.2d 551, 554–55 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that coverage applied on a negligence theory,
and that the lower court had misapplied the causation analysis in a case where insureds’ property had
been damaged by rain, an excluded cause).
130. 189 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1983) (applying Partridge to find coverage based on
negligence where the insureds’ home had been damaged by rain, an excluded cause).
131. Bragg, supra note 14, at 389–91, 393.
132. Id. at 391, 393.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 196–99.
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134

policies. These alterations limited recovery by squeezing negligencerelated causes out of the picture and creating exclusions—particularly for
different types of catastrophic loss—to deny coverage where the loss
135
would not have occurred but for the excluded peril. However, the
ultimate success or failure of these measures is still up for debate in
California.
Although the California Supreme Court has never expressly ruled
136
on the issue, many commentators have simply taken for granted that
ACC clauses are unenforceable in California, since the courts’
interpretation of Insurance Code sections 530 and 532 suggests that the
137
EPC doctrine is not susceptible to alteration by contractual terms.
Ultimately, this conclusion may stem from the fact that historically,
138
California decisions and policy choices have often been pro-insured.
Before we examine why ACC clauses may actually be permitted under
certain circumstances, we must first look at the cases undermining their
enforceability.
First, prior to the decision in Garvey, the Fresno County Superior
Court refused to enforce ACC language in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Motte,
139
a coverage case involving earthquake damage. The court held that the
ACC language was invalid because the policyholders were not
sufficiently informed, and that although “earthquake” was a specifically
excluded cause of loss, tectonic plate slippage (the actual cause of the
140
earthquake event) was not expressly excluded. In any event, the court
found, negligent design was a concurrent cause of the loss and thus,
141
coverage applied. Safeco decided not to pursue the issue at the time,
but the industry pushed back, attempting to strengthen the ACC clauses
142
in their policies.

134. Bragg, supra note 14, at 393–94.
135. Id.
136. Scott G. Johnson, The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine in California: Ten Years After
Garvey, J. Ins. Coverage, Autumn 1999, at 1, 13.
137. See, e.g., Lavitt, supra note 14, at 17; Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35 tbl. 1; Passa, supra
note 8, at 572; Johnson, supra note 136, at 13.
138. Some suggest that one of the goals of California’s method of “causation analysis may be its
demonstrated passion to find ways to compensate injured parties even at the expense of breaking
down common law distinctions between tort and contract.” Bragg, supra note 14, at 388. Examples of
more insured-friendly policies include California’s application of the doctrine of contra proferentem,
the rule that ambiguities in a contract are to be interpreted against the drafter, as well as the doctrine
of reasonable expectations. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990).
139. Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 60 (citing No. 0298082-9 (Fresno County Cal. Super. Ct. July
1984)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Bragg, supra note 14, at 390–91.
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In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Guyton, Safeco litigated a flood insurance
143
coverage issue. The water district had not taken sufficient measures to
stop flooding from heavy rains. The policy read: “This policy does not
insure against loss: . . . 1. caused by, resulting from, contributed to or
144
aggravated by any of the following: a. flood, surface water, waves . . . .”
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, relying on Partridge, held that this
exclusion was insufficient to bar coverage if negligence was also a
145
proximate cause of the loss.
These two cases were decided prior to Garvey. Although they
demonstrate disfavor for insurers’ attempts to draft policies around
concurrent causation, Garvey changed the game by barring the
concurrent causation analysis from first-party property insurance
coverage cases, while leaving open the question of whether ACC clauses
146
would be enforceable in the future. Thereafter, in Howell v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., decided post-Garvey in 1990, an appellate court
147
suggested that the California courts would refuse to enforce them.
In Howell, the plaintiff owned a home, three rental units, and a dog
148
kennel, all of which were insured by State Farm under various policies.
Unfortunately, Howell’s property was located on a slope susceptible to
landslides, and a fire had destroyed much of the protective vegetation
149
nearby, making the slope more vulnerable. The following winter, the
slope failed during heavy rainfall, and a major landslide occurred,
150
destroying much of her property. State Farm denied coverage, claiming
that the loss was not the result of landslide but of earth movement and
151
water damage, neither of which were covered.
The exclusions sections of Howell’s policies included the following
ACC language:
We do not insure under any coverage for loss (including collapse of an
insured building or part of a building) which would not have occurred
in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We do
not insure for such loss regardless of: a) the cause of the excluded
event; or b) other causes of the loss; or c) whether other causes acted
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce
152
the loss . . . .

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

692 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 552–53 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 554–55.
See supra text accompanying notes 115–27.
267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715–16 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 709–10.
Id. at 710.
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Earth movement and water damage were among the excluded perils.
Citing sections 530 and 532, Sabella, and Garvey, the court held the ACC
clause unenforceable, stating that an “insurer may not limit its liability in
this manner, since the statutory and judicial law of this state make the
insurer liable whenever a covered peril is the ‘efficient proximate cause’
154
of the loss, regardless of other contributing causes.” The court
explained that “if we were to give full effect to the . . . policy language
excluding coverage whenever an excluded peril is a contributing or
aggravating factor in the loss, we would be giving insurance companies
155
carte blanche to deny coverage in nearly all cases.”
From this, it may appear that California has a tight grip on the EPC
doctrine, and that ACC clause alteration of the doctrine is impermissible.
Without a definitive California Supreme Court ruling, we cannot be
certain. But even if we assume that California is one of the few states
refusing to apply ACC clauses, its hold seems to be slipping. A pair of
156
and
recent cases, Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co.
157
Freedman v. State Farm Insurance Co., reveal a developing slippery slope
of exceptions to the EPC rules. In Julian, the plaintiffs’ home had been
located just under a slope that failed after heavy rainfall, which caused a
158
tree to fall on the house. The Julians’ home had been insured by
159
Hartford under a general homeowner’s all-risk policy. Among the
exclusions in the policy were the following clauses:
1. We do not insure against loss caused directly or indirectly by any of
the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or
event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss: . . .
b. Earth Movement, meaning . . . landslide . . . .
c. Water Damage . . . .
2. We do not insure against loss to property . . . caused by any of the
following. However, any ensuing loss to property . . . not excluded or
excepted in this policy is covered.
a. Weather conditions. However, this exclusion only applies if
weather conditions contribute in any way with a cause or event
160
excluded in paragraph 1. above to produce the loss . . . .

Certain “acts, errors or omissions in design or construction” were also
161
excluded under the policy. Hartford denied coverage on the theory that
no possible EPC could be covered under the circumstances, as the policy

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 715 n.6.
110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005).
93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009).
Julian, 110 P.3d at 905.
Id. at 905 n.2.
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
Id.
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excluded earth movement, third-party negligence, and “weather
conditions” if they “contribute in any way with” another excluded peril,
162
in this case, landslide. The Julians argued, on the contrary, that the
EPC was either negligence, weather conditions alone, or collapse
163
unrelated to flood, none of which were effectively excluded. Tellingly,
the California Supreme Court framed the issue as whether section 530
and the EPC doctrine “inflexibly” prohibit insurers from excluding some
164
weather conditions and not others.
While giving credence to Garvey, Howell, and the notion that
insurers should not be permitted to employ sweeping policy terms to
contract around the EPC doctrine or to render the insured’s coverage
165
the court nevertheless found the “weather
“virtually illusory,”
conditions” clause to be an enforceable exclusion, because perils may be
defined “in terms of a relationship between two otherwise distinct
166
perils.” This reasoning effectively creates an escape clause to the EPC
doctrine. Since the doctrine is only implicated when multiple perils cause
167
a single loss, permitting insurers to manufacture a single peril out of the
relationship between two distinct perils allows them to circumvent the
doctrine.
The court likened the exclusion to a policy that covers weather
conditions generally but excludes specific weather conditions such as
rain, hail, or wind, and justified enforcing the exclusion by virtue of the
168
insured’s reasonable expectations. Relying heavily on the insurer’s
engineering report stating that landslides of the type involved are
“always” caused by water, the court explained that a reasonable insured
would understand the term “contribute in any way with” in this
169
particular policy to exclude rain contributing to landslide. But this
rationale is problematic. At the outset, it may very well be that on this
particular property, if the policy had named “rain” in combination with
other excluded perils, a reasonable insured should have interpreted the
clause to exclude landslide caused by rain. But the insurer, instead, chose
the overbroad terms “weather conditions” and “contributing in any way
with” to effectuate its intent. Whether there is sufficient difference in
170
clarity between these terms and the terms used in Howell for a
reasonable insured to be expected to anticipate this exclusion is
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 911.
See 7 Russ & Segalla, supra note 9, § 101:55.
Julian, 110 P.3d at 911–12.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 152–54.

Young_62-HLJ-757 (Do Not Delete)

778

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/4/2011 12:32 PM

[Vol. 62:757

debatable. More importantly, the court’s rationale is troubling, because
the exclusion does not seem sufficiently narrow to avoid the “illusory”
coverage problems condemned in Howell.
As United Policyholders pointed out in an amicus brief, reading the
clauses literally meant that if the Julians’ loss had been caused ninetynine percent by a weather condition and one percent by a negligible
amount of earth movement or water, then it would not have been
171
covered. This is the exact result that Garvey, Howell, and the EPC
doctrine attempt to avoid. Even the Julian court recognized this, stating
that the use of the phrase “contribute in any way with” to link landslides
with weather conditions “seems particularly designed to circumvent the
172
efficient proximate cause doctrine.” In its opinion, the court warns that
a case resembling United Policyholders’s hypothetical would “raise
troubling questions regarding the clause’s consistency with the efficient
proximate cause doctrine. Denial of coverage for such a loss would
173
suggest the provision of illusory insurance against weather conditions.”
As a result, the court limited its holding to the specific facts (rain and
landslide), again relying heavily on the engineer’s report that landslide in
174
these cases is “always” caused by water.
Julian seemed to be an isolated event at first. In fact, a few years
175
later, an appellate court decided De Bruyn v. Superior Court. There,
the court noted that Julian was limited to its facts and refused to allow an
insurer to claim that under Julian, insurers may exclude particular perils
176
“however caused,” without reference to the EPC doctrine. The court,
however, proceeded to apply Julian’s reasoning that an insurer may
cover certain forms of a peril and exclude other forms of the same
177
peril. Interestingly, the facts in De Bruyn create a case where such
reasoning can be more soundly applied than did the facts in Julian itself.
In De Bruyn, the homeowners returned from vacation to discover water
178
and mold damage caused by an overflowed toilet. After review, their
insurer agreed to cover the water damage from the overflow, but refused
179
to cover any mold damage. The homeowner’s policy generally excluded
water damage but expressly included water damage from “sudden and
accidental discharge or overflow of water from within a
180
plumbing . . . system.” This inclusion was itself expressly limited by a

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Julian, 110 P.3d at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 911–12.
70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652 (Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Id. at 658.
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clause stating that mold would not be covered under any
181
circumstances.
Under these circumstances, basing a decision on the reasonable
expectations of the insured—as the Julian court did—is relatively
unremarkable. The problem with the holding in Julian is not that it is
unreasonable to allow insurers to cover certain forms of a peril and
exclude other forms, but that insurers should not be permitted to
combine perils to circumvent the EPC doctrine or to effectuate “illusory”
coverage when they do so. In De Bruyn, the insurer covered some forms
of water damage and not others; there was no “combined” peril. They
did not use the mold exclusion to enable them to deny the whole claim,
just the portion of the damage caused by mold. Therefore, coverage was
not rendered illusory. As such, De Bruyn is a good example of how a
policy covering only certain forms of a peril might be applied fairly,
meeting the reasonable expectations of the insured.
While it seemed that Julian had been successfully limited to its facts,
the court muddied the waters in 2009 when it decided Freedman v. State
182
In Freedman, a contractor remodeling the
Farm Insurance Co.
183
Freedmans’ bathroom had unknowingly driven a nail through a pipe.
The nail caused no leakage at first, but years later, it corroded and water
184
began to leak slowly, causing extensive water damage. State Farm
185
denied the entire claim. Under the homeowner’s policy, water damage
186
caused by rust was excluded from coverage. Along with this, the
following “combined peril” clauses were added:
We do not insure for loss described in [the exclusions paragraphs]
regardless of whether one or more of the following: (a) directly or
indirectly cause, contribute to or aggravate the loss; or (b) occur
before, at the same time, or after the loss or any other cause of the loss:
a. conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of any person, group,
organization or governmental body whether intentional, wrongful,
negligent, or without fault;
b. defect, weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness in: . . .
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, construction, grading,
187
compaction . . . .

While the Freedmans claimed the EPC of their loss was the contractor’s
negligence, State Farm contended that the EPC was irrelevant as third-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied (2009).
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298–99.
Id. at 299.
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party negligence was excluded under the policy whenever it combined
188
with other excluded perils (in this case, water damage).
189
The Freedman court, relying on Julian, upheld the exclusion.
Without a single mention of the Julian court’s warnings regarding the
EPC doctrine or the limitation of Julian to its facts, the Freedman court
agreed with State Farm, explaining that third-party negligence was
190
excluded under the policy whenever it combined with water damage.
The court also rejected without discussion the Freedmans’ argument that
191
the negligence exclusion was not sufficiently clear. Here we can see the
danger in Julian’s holding. Presumably, if the Freedmans’ loss had been
ninety-nine percent the result of third-party negligence combined with
some slight water damage, the Freedmans would be left without
coverage. More importantly, unlike the evidence in Julian that the type
of landslide at issue was “always” caused by water, there was no such
evidence in Freedman linking negligence and pipe leakage. Thus, the
appellate court seems to have expanded Julian’s scope and given insurers
license to combine any set of perils, thereby eluding the EPC doctrine.
This slope is poised to fail.
Julian and its progeny throw the certainty of California’s grasp on
the EPC doctrine into doubt. While “combined peril” clauses are not
classic ACC clauses, this new strategy of creating a single peril out of the
relationship between two distinct perils accomplishes a similar goal. The
192
purpose of ACC clauses is to circumvent the EPC doctrine. While the
“combined peril” language is less all-encompassing than the typical “but
for” ACC clause, broad terms such as “weather conditions” come close
to the line and effectively avoid the EPC doctrine. Take Freedman for
example: Insurers had been concerned about the courts’ twenty-five-year
trend of allowing coverage for negligence for a loss that seemed to be
193
excluded by the express provisions in their policies. By fashioning a
single excluded peril that arises only when negligence combines with a
another distinct excluded peril, insurers achieve two things: first, they are
able to circumvent the EPC doctrine on that issue; second, they eschew
the loss in premiums that would necessarily result if they were to exclude
negligence altogether. In other words, they get to have their cake and eat
it too.
Even if we were not as concerned with “combined peril” exclusions
as we are with ACC clauses, it seems apparent from the Julian line of
cases that at the very least, the EPC doctrine is not impermeable in

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
See Rossmiller, supra note 1, at 46.
Bragg, supra note 14, at 389–91, 393.
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California. We have no crystal ball to tell us how the courts will apply
Julian in the future, or to what number and breadth of factual scenarios
and combinations of perils these clauses will be applied. Insurers will
have to guess how far they can push the envelope. Insureds will be forced
to guess which “weather conditions” are most likely to exacerbate other
exclusions in their policies and whether negligence is likely to be a factor,
all while paying premiums that reflect coverage for these classes of perils
generally. Unfortunately, it is exactly this sort of uncertainty that can
194
make application of the EPC doctrine so troublesome.
2. The Earthquake Problem
Not only have insurers won ground on the judicial front in their
efforts to avoid the EPC doctrine, but they have also won significant
ground on the legislative front. Despite the addition of ACC clause
limitations to homeowner’s policies, insurers still feared that because
previous causation decisions—Sabella and its kin—were couched in
terms of Insurance Code sections 530 and 532, courts might ultimately
determine that the EPC analysis was so entrenched that they could not
permit insurers to “contract around” it without legislative consent, either
195
implicit or express. Thus, the insurance industry launched the second
prong of its attack, lobbying the California legislature for protection,
196
Several years and
particularly from earthquake-related damage.
rejected bills later, the industry succeeded in having Assembly Bill
197
198
2865, enacted in 1984, shortly before Garvey. The new sections
created an express exemption for earthquake loss from the EPC analysis.
Section 10088 states, in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 530, 532, or any other
provision of law, and in the absence of an endorsement or an
additional policy provision specifically covering the peril of
earthquake, no policy which by its terms does not cover the peril of
earthquake shall provide or shall be held to provide coverage for any
loss or damage when earthquake is a proximate cause regardless of
whether the loss or damage also directly or indirectly results from, or is
contributed to, concurrently or in any sequence by any other proximate
199
or remote cause, whether or not covered by the policy.

Section 10088.5 adds that section 10088 does not “exempt[] an insurer
from its obligation under a fire insurance policy to cover losses of a fire

194. See supra notes 46–47, 78 and accompanying text.
195. See Bragg, supra note 14, at 398.
196. Id.
197. Assemb. B. 2865, 1983–84 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (codified at Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10081–
10089.4 (West 2005)).
198. Bragg, supra note 14, at 398.
199. Ins. § 10088.
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which is caused by or follows an earthquake.” Thus, any cause of loss
other than fire, such as negligent construction, explosion, flooding, and
the like, will not be covered if they occur in a situation in which an
earthquake can be considered one proximate cause of the damage. In
effect, section 10088 functions as a sort of legislatively-mandated ACC
clause tailored to earthquake loss; unless a separate earthquake policy is
in place, an earthquake will be considered the proximate cause and the
loss will not be covered, regardless of any other covered, concurrent
201
causes. Note that this also applies to loss for which aftershocks are a
202
proximate cause.
But with this exemption, the insurance industry took the bitter as
well as the sweet. In exchange for the causation concession, insurers
became required to offer earthquake coverage along with any residential
203
property insurance coverage. The insurer can make the coverage offer
directly or arrange for it to be made by a third-party insurer, but the
statute requires a particular written format and an explanation to
policyholders that they will not be covered for any earthquake damage
204
under their policy without purchasing separate earthquake coverage.
The intent behind these provisions was certainly to protect insurance
companies from insolvency following a major earthquake event—but it
was also to encourage California homeowners to purchase adequate
205
earthquake coverage and to ensure such coverage would be available.
This bill seemed the perfect solution to the earthquake insurance
problem until the Northridge earthquake hit in 1994 and caused over $12
206
billion in insurance losses. Scientists had been unaware that a fault line
existed in the area until the earthquake hit, illustrating another difficulty
in anticipating earthquakes and implementing coverage, even in California
207
where earthquakes are widely understood to be a threat. Similar to the
200. Id. § 10088.5.
201. See Consumers: Earthquake Insurance, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
0100-consumers/0060-information-guides/0040-residential/earthquake-insurance.cfm (last visited Feb.
2, 2011) (explaining that under section 10088, earthquake will be considered the proximate cause of a
loss regardless of any other causes that might be covered under the homeowner’s property insurance).
202. Id.
203. Ins. § 10081 (requiring insurers issuing new or renewed residential property insurance policies
to offer earthquake coverage also, either provided in the residential property policy itself or in a
separate policy); see also Bragg, supra note 14, at 398. The minimum amount is set forth in
section 10089. Ins. § 10089.
204. See generally Ins. §§ 10081–10089.4 (laying out the various formal requirements for offers of
earthquake insurance).
205. See e.g., Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 173–74 (9th Cir. 1997); Marina
Green Homeowners Ass’n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1994);
Williams v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Cal. Rptr. 644, 646–47 (Ct. App. 1990); Bragg, supra note
14, at 398.
206. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 62; Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32847,
Tsunamis and Earthquakes: Is Federal Disaster Insurance in Our Future? 14 (2005).
207. Ericson & Doyle, supra note 29, at 187.
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response following Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, after the 1994
Northridge earthquake, the insurance industry fled the scene, greatly
restricted homeowner’s insurance policy sales in California, and in some
208
cases, refused to sell any new homeowner’s policies. Some insurers
209
went so far as to engage in fraud in order to avoid coverage. Much like
Florida had done in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, California
established the California Earthquake Authority (“CEA”) to combat the
210
problem. While the response was similar, the CEA’s structure is
significantly different from that of the FHCF.
The CEA is a publicly-managed but largely privately-funded
organization designed to oversee and administer earthquake “mini” or
add-on policies, which participating insurance companies may offer in
211
order to satisfy the requirement imposed by section 10081. For a
service charge, participating insurers offer the mini-policies, manage the
details, and accept all premiums from the insureds on behalf of the
212
CEA. Of course, insureds are not required to accept the offer of
earthquake coverage, but when they do, the mini-policies provide
skeletal coverage protecting only their dwellings, not outside structures
213
such as swimming pools and patios, from earthquake shake loss.
Presumably, damage caused by any ensuing fire, explosion, or water
damage (non-shake loss) would then be covered under standard
214
homeowner’s insurance policies. The CEA is currently reported to be
in good financial health with a claims-paying capacity of approximately
215
$9.8 billion.
But financial health is, unfortunately, not always an accurate
measure of success. While the CEA is sound enough to withstand a 250year earthquake event, to date, only twelve-to-thirteen percent of
216
California homeowners have actually purchased earthquake insurance.
The scientific community agrees that a 6.7 magnitude earthquake is

208. Hearings, supra note 2, at 62; King, supra note 206, at 14.
209. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 841–42 (Ct. App.
1997) (detailing plaintiff’s evidence that following the Northridge earthquake, State Farm representatives
forged the insured’s signature on documents, destroyed evidence, manufactured evidence, and
employed evasive litigation strategies in order to conceal information related to whether State Farm
had fulfilled section 10088’s requirements).
210. Hearings, supra note 2, at 62; King, supra note 206, at 14.
211. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 63–64.
212. Id. at 63.
213. Claire Wilkinson, Ins. Info. Inst., The California Earthquake Authority 3–4 (2008).
214. King, supra note 206, at 14.
215. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64; see California Earthquake Authority—Version 2.0 Financial
Rating, Cal. Earthquake Auth., http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/index.aspx?id=36&pid=1 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
216. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65; Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
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guaranteed to occur somewhere in California in the next thirty years.
Illustrating the danger, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake, the worst the area
218
has seen since 1892, struck Baja California, Mexico on April 4, 2010,
causing what experts estimate should not exceed $1 billion total in
219
damage, with $300 million in insured losses. Fortunately for California,
it was not at the epicenter of the quake, and most of the momentum
220
progressed northwest. But the state will not always be so lucky. In fact,
221
most Californians live within twenty miles of a fault line. This means
that in the wake of a major earthquake event, California homeowners
may suffer unprecedented (and uncovered) loss, despite the CEA’s
existence. Prior to the Baja California event, Glenn Pomeroy, the Chief
Executive Officer of the CEA, gave the following example to
demonstrate the problem: Following a 7.2 magnitude earthquake striking
the peninsular region on the San Andreas Fault, which leads up through
San Francisco, homeowners could suffer over $55.1 billion in losses, but
222
at the current rate, only $4.1 billion would actually be covered. This is
223
despite the fact that the CEA has the capacity to pay up to $9.8 billion.
Why are so many California homeowners uninsured despite the
likelihood of a quake, the availability of CEA policies, and the
requirement that they be offered (and reoffered) earthquake insurance?
224
Simply put, coverage is still too expensive. Particularly in high-risk
areas, earthquake insurance policies can cost more, alone, than the rate
225
of basic homeowner’s and fire insurance. On top of that, most policies
require a fifteen percent deductible, meaning that a home would need to
suffer a great deal of loss before the insured sees a dime from the
226
insurance company. For many the benefits simply do not outweigh the
227
costs.
Why are the CEA policies so expensive? Mr. Pomeroy explains that
the high cost results from the fact that the CEA’s own “reinsurance costs
228
are simply massive.” The CEA depends upon reinsurance for much of
229
its claim-paying capacity. At this point, approximately forty percent of

217. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64.
218. Magnitude 7.2—Baja California, Mexico, USGS (Apr. 4, 2010), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/ci14607652.php#summary.
219. Experts Estimate $300 Million in Losses from Mexico Earthquake, Ins. J. (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2010/04/06/108788.htm.
220. USGS, supra note 218.
221. Hearings, supra note 2, at 64.
222. Id. at 65.
223. Id. at 64.
224. Id. at 65; King, supra note 206, at 14.
225. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65.
226. Id.; see Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
227. Hearings, supra note 2, at 65.
228. Id. at 66.
229. Id.
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the CEA’s premium revenue goes to paying the high cost of reinsurance
in the global market, and reinsurers have paid back only $250,000 in
230
claims over the past thirteen years. Essentially, the CEA is forced to
spend forty percent of its premium revenue each year for reinsurance
coverage for a mega-catastrophe (defined as a 545-year earthquake
231
event) that is highly unlikely to occur. Worse still, in 2010, the price of
the CEA’s reinsurance contracts rose further by fifteen percent and will
232
only continue to rise. As premiums go up, it is safe to assume that the
number of homeowners who chose to purchase insurance will only drop.
3. California’s Approach to Causation and Catastrophe Insurance
Is on Shaky Ground
California’s approach, combining the bright-line Garvey rules for
EPC analysis with the earthquake exception and the CEA, presents an
example of one workable framework that other states, such as those in
the Gulf Coast, might follow to resolve the uncertainty of causation
analysis and catastrophe coverage. Theoretically, a codified EPC analysis
should remove much uncertainty as to when it will be applied or whether
it may be contracted around. The earthquake exception and the CEA
then relieve the insurance industry of one of the EPC doctrine’s failings:
the possibility that the industry might be hit with unanticipated claims
after a major catastrophe.
But, of course, that is only in theory. Based on the foregoing, the
solution is far from trustworthy as it stands. Cases such as Julian and
Freedman demonstrate that insurers have been able to effectively
contract around the EPC doctrine, despite Garvey. Moreover, the
current earthquake insurance regime is insufficient to protect against a
major earthquake event. Barely twelve-to-thirteen percent of
Californians have actually purchased earthquake coverage for their
233
homes. At this rate, California homeowners could end up in the same
position as Katrina victims: with unprecedented loss and only the hope of
an ad hoc federal bailout to rescue them following a major earthquake
event. In short, California—and other states wishing to follow
California’s example—needs to plug up the leaks.
Part II of this Note has examined the state of the EPC doctrine and
the role of ACC language in post-Katrina litigation. It has also revealed
the uncertainty plaguing the California model, both with regards to the
EPC doctrine, as well as to gaps in earthquake coverage. Part III of this
Note will suggest a two-tiered solution, recommending that the

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 65; Bowers, supra note 2, at 23.
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California courts limit Julian’s effect on the judicial level, and that
Congress enact the Homeowners’ Defense Act on the legislative level.

III. The California Approach Revisited: A Two-Tiered Solution
As we have seen, the causation problem is intricate: First, the EPC
doctrine has been applied haphazardly, leading to uncertainty for insured
and insurer alike. Second, refusing to give force to insurers’ attempts to
“contract around” the doctrine can lead to justifiable concerns on the
part of insurers regarding catastrophic loss. Third, catastrophic events
tend to lead to a mass exodus of insurers, leaving little homeowner’s
insurance to be found. A brief side-by-side comparison of California and
Florida, two states that have implemented state-managed disaster relief
programs, will demonstrate the mechanisms states have employed to
combat these problems.
In California, the EPC doctrine is codified, and until recently, the
courts seemed disinclined to allow insurers to contract around it. In order
to quell the insurance industry’s fears regarding earthquake coverage,
the California legislature statutorily barred earthquake damage from the
EPC analysis. Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake, California
created the CEA to increase the availability of earthquake insurance and
to entice insurers to return. Unfortunately, since only twelve-to-thirteen
percent of California homeowners are currently covered, the CEA’s
financial health is essentially moot.
Compare this to the Floridian response: The Florida courts have
substituted a concurrent causation analysis in place of the EPC
234
doctrine. Following Hurricane Andrew, Florida created the FHCF in
235
order to induce insurers to return to the Florida market. Unlike the
CEA, which requires insureds to purchase a separate “mini-policy” to
cover earthquake loss, the FHCF incorporates its wind/water protection
236
Unfortunately,
into the body of standard homeowner’s policies.
237
however, the FHCF is seriously financially overextended.
The benefit of the Floridian concurrent causation model is that
238
results are much easier to anticipate in the average case. Where there
are two “but for” causes, one of which is not covered and one of which is
239
covered, coverage applies. However, under Garvey’s application of
Insurance Code sections 530 and 532, it is unlikely that the California
courts will adopt the Floridian model unless the legislature amends those
sections. More importantly, applying a concurrent causation analysis to
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 35.
Bowers, supra note 2, at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
Knutsen, supra note 78, at 983.
Phillips & Coplen, supra note 8, at 33–34.
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first-party property coverage seems to tip the scale too far to the
240
insureds’ side, as it may essentially nullify all the exclusions in a policy.
On the catastrophic-loss front, the FHCF and the CEA seem to be
equally flawed, equally unsound. So how should California prepare itself
for the inevitable “big one”? The following proposal incorporates both a
judicial as well as legislative response.
A. A Judicial Response
First, at the judicial level, the California courts need to seal the gap
left by Julian. As commentators have noted, inconsistency in the
application of causation analyses in insurance cases imposes significant
241
costs on the court, insurer, and insured. In fact, the California courts
have been accused of fluctuating between three different doctrinal
242
approaches to causation within the last thirty years. But the doctrinal
shifts inherent in the Sabella, Partridge, and Garvey cases can be
attributed to a need to differentiate between two distinct types of
insurance: first-party property and third-party liability insurance.
Additionally, the shift inherent in the court’s decision in Julian seems to
have been unintentional; indeed, the court held Julian to be limited to its
243
facts. Accordingly, while the logic in Julian that an insurer should be
able to cover certain forms of a peril and not other forms is capable of
244
being properly applied, as evidenced in De Bruyn, the California courts
should reestablish that Julian is not to be employed to create another
costly shift in policy. Insurers should not be permitted to paralyze the
EPC doctrine by turning two distinct perils into a single peril, or to effect
“illusory” coverage.
Commentators have argued that the EPC approach creates
uncertainty above and beyond doctrinal fluctuations, insofar as the
245
outcomes of individual cases are unpredictable. And courts have only
246
complicated the issue by inconsistently applying ACC clauses. As a
result, some commentators have thrown up their hands, arguing for a

240. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 705 (Cal. 1989); Knutsen, supra note 78,
at 984.
241. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
242. Knutsen, supra note 78, at 979 & n.67 (noting that within a thirty-year period, the California
courts adopted a concurrent causation analysis in Partridge, then an EPC approach for first-party
property coverage in Garvey, and most recently, narrowed the approach by allowing “combined peril”
exclusions as an exception to the doctrine in Julian).
243. Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 110 P.3d 903, 911–12 (Cal. 2005).
244. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text.
245. See Knutsen, supra note 78, at 981 (explaining that the EPC doctrine’s all-or-nothing
approach leads to consistency problems in that it can require an impossible “metaphysical debate” in
some cases and unusually high litigation costs in others).
246. Id.
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complete abandonment of the EPC doctrine. But there is a much less
drastic solution. It would be naïve to hope there will ever be a causation
analysis that solves all outcome inconsistency problems. But we may
attempt to avoid those inconsistencies that are the most troublesome.
Inconsistency becomes particularly problematic when dealing with
248
California’s
mega-catastrophes like earthquakes and hurricanes.
approach can function as a practical solution that is both workable and
fair. By codifying the EPC doctrine and refusing to allow insurers to
contract around it, much inconsistency can be eliminated. Statutorily
exempting catastrophic loss such as earthquakes from this rule both
reassures insurers and simultaneously encourages insureds to take steps
to protect themselves. But the benefits of the California system are lost if
insurers are permitted to take incremental swipes at the EPC doctrine.
The courts, therefore, should minimize the costly effects of inconsistency
by restricting Julian’s reach and reasserting the primacy of the doctrine.
B. A Legislative Response
In order for the California approach to be most effective, a
legislative response is also necessary to prepare the state for an
impending natural catastrophe. Unfortunately, history has shown that
the private insurance market will not, or cannot, insure against the
249
significant catastrophic risk that many states face —at least not at a cost
250
homeowners can afford. Too few homeowners are willing to purchase
earthquake insurance, instead choosing to rely on luck and ad hoc
251
federal disaster relief efforts. Legislators have frequently called for the
creation of a federal disaster insurance program to off-set the
shortcomings of the private market, but Congress has generally
252
declined.
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) is one outlier.
NFIP is a federal disaster insurance program created to provide flood
insurance in exchange for an agreement by participating communities to
247. See, e.g., id. (arguing for the application of “apportionment” and “liberal” approaches to
causation, following a more rigorous categorization of the involvement of each cause in a loss); Lavitt,
supra note 14, at 47–63 (arguing for the repurposing of tort law principles, as announced in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, to apply to four paradigmatic insurance causation scenarios).
248. See Knutsen, supra note 78, at 991–92, 1022.
249. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 10; King, supra note 206, at 12; Orszag & Fontaine, supra
note 86, at 10. See generally Ericson & Doyle, supra note 29, at 184–211 (providing an in-depth
discussion of this problem, and tracing the uncertainty of earthquakes and the insurance industry’s
failure, to date, to provide adequate coverage, even to the point that some insurers provide far more
coverage than they can actually support in the event of a large earthquake).
250. Hearings, supra note 2, at 12; King, supra note 206, at 12.
251. King, supra note 206, at 13.
252. Id. at 22 (citing a failure to agree on what sort of national catastrophe insurance program
would work, a fear of unnecessary government intrusion into the private sector, and the concern that
the “true” cost of such a program could be quite high).
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253

adopt floodplain management measures. But coverage under NFIP has
created much confusion due to an apparent overlap with private
insurance coverage, as well as with other state programs such as Florida’s
254
Some have
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“CPIC”).
claimed that this confusion even facilitated independent claims adjusters
foisting off onto the federal government Katrina-related damage that
255
ought to have been covered by private insurers. NFIP detractors claim
that the program owes billions of dollars to the U.S. Treasury and fails to
256
charge premiums that will cover its costs. NFIP’s performance, it is
argued, demonstrates the inevitable failure of any further attempts by
257
the federal government to enter into the disaster insurance arena.
Other arguments leveled against a federal disaster insurance plan evince
concerns that such a program may cost tax payers billions and encourage
258
coastal development that could harm the environment.
While these arguments are well taken, history has shown that the
federal government is already effectively the insurer of last resort
259
following a natural catastrophe. Whether Congress sweeps in with an
ad hoc federal bailout, as it did following Katrina, or whether it
establishes a proactive, measured approach, people look to the Congress
260
to help rebuild their lives when disaster strikes. Indeed, most insurance
market analysts agree that there is not a single state in the union without
261
exposure to natural catastrophes. Federal bailouts, of course, also come
from taxpayer pockets and create a false sense of security on the part of
homeowners, who become apathetic towards taking loss-prevention
262
steps. There is simply a more economical approach: Congress can work
directly with the private industry and existing state relief programs in

253. FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Program Description 1 (2002).
254. King, supra note 87, at 1–2; Lavitt, supra note 14, at 46.
255. Stephanie Grace, Flood Program Free-For-All: Did Insurance Companies Take a Blank
Check?, Times-Picayune, June 17, 2007, at B7.
256. See, e.g., David C. John & Matt Mayer, Homeowners’ Defense Act Rewards States for Bad
Property Insurance Decisions, The Heritage Found. (July 29, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Reports/2009/07/Homeowners-Defense-Act-Rewards-States-for-Bad-Property-Insurance-Decisions;
Eli Lehrer, Ensuring Disaster, Am. Spectator (May 2, 2008, 12:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/
2008/05/02/ensuring-disaster.
257. John & Mayer, supra note 256; Lehrer, supra note 256.
258. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Geo. Envtl. L. & Pol’y Inst., Coastal Disaster Insurance in the
Era of Global Warming 1 (2007); John & Mayer, supra note 256; Arthur D. Postal, Environmental
Groups Oppose Homeowners Defense Act, Nat’l Underwriter (June 1, 2010, 10:20 AM),
http://www.property-casualty.com/News/2010/6/Pages/Environmental-Groups-Oppose-HomeownersDefense-Act.aspx.
259. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 17–18.
260. Id. at 1.
261. Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33086, Hurricane Katrina: Insurance Losses
and National Capacities for Financing Disaster Risk 7 (2005).
262. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 17–18.
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order to protect Americans from natural catastrophes by reintroducing
263
and enacting the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009.
The HDA was initially introduced in Congress in 2007 and then
264
reintroduced by Representative Ron Klein in 2009. Although it passed
265
the House Financial Services Committee in 2010, it has not yet been
266
reintroduced in the new session. The HDA is a federal catastrophe
insurance proposal establishing “an integrated public-private partnership”
that would not only create more disaster coverage at a lower price, but
also would incentivize the adoption of catastrophe loss-mitigation
267
strategies. Additionally, the differentiation in premiums that will result
from the plan may encourage homeowners to remain in or perhaps even
relocate to less disaster-prone areas, thereby alleviating some concerns
268
over environmental effects.
Title I of the HDA would establish a voluntary National
269
Catastrophe Risk Consortium among participating states. Under this
plan, homeowners would purchase coverage from private or state
residual insurers, who would then assign some or all of the catastrophe
270
risk to state reinsurance programs approved by the Consortium. The
state reinsurance programs would work with the Consortium to transfer
the risk via insurance-linked securities or coordinated reinsurance
271
contracts. Title II of the HDA would set forth a three-year federal
commitment to guarantee or “backstop” debt issued by approved state
insurance and reinsurance programs that are either involved in
residential property insurance coverage or designed to enhance the
272
private market for such coverage. In order to participate, states must
agree to adopt loss-mitigation programs and zoning and land use plans to
273
help mitigate losses caused by natural disasters. They must further:
(1) maintain expressly qualified state programs; (2) prove that their
263. H.R. 2555, 111th Cong. (2009).
264. Rooney Supports Measure to Lower Property Insurance Costs, Congressman Tom Rooney,
http://rooney.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3059&Itemid=300045 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011); H.R. 3355 [110th]: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2007, GovTrack.us,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3355 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
265. H.R. 2555: Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, OpenCongress, http://www.opencongress.org/
bill/111-h2555/actions (last visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also Financial Services Committee Approves
Homeowners Defense Act, CCH Fin. Reform News Ctr. (Apr. 28, 2010, 3:57 PM),
http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2010/04/financial-services-committee-approves-homeownersdefense-act.html.
266. See Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010, supra note 4.
267. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 2, 18–19.
268. Id. at 22.
269. Rawle O. King, Cong. Research Serv., RL 40680, Financing Catastrophic Risk: Summary
of the Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009 (S. 505 and H.R. 2555) 2–3 (2009).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 3.
272. Id.
273. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 2.
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program’s designs and rates are actuarially sound; and (3) limit stateissued debt to eighty percent of their qualifying assets, among other
274
The U.S. Treasury would charge a fee for each
requirements.
guarantee of no more than 0.5%, and any debt incurred by the state
275
programs must be repaid within thirty years. Title III would establish a
Federal Natural Catastrophe Reinsurance Fund allowing the state
programs to purchase one-year “excess-of-loss” reinsurance policies
from the U.S. Treasury to cover 200-year (and beyond) events, to a
276
maximum aggregate federal liability of $200 billion per year. Finally,
Title IV of the HDA would require Mitigation Grant Programs to help
277
prevent or mitigate loss caused by natural disasters.
From the foregoing, it is easy to see how the HDA would directly
affect the availability and prevalence of earthquake insurance in
California. Under Title II, state programs such as the CEA would be able
to reduce their current dependence on costly annual reinsurance. As a
result, earthquake coverage premiums would decrease by an estimated
thirty-five percent, deductibles would be cut in half, and consumers
278
would be provided with more choices. By the CEA’s own estimation,
this would double the number of Californians able to purchase
earthquake insurance and encourage further prophylactic measures to
279
protect property from catastrophic loss. This strategy will enhance the
CEA’s impact and will enable California to maximize the utility of its
plan in preparation for the “big one.” Other disaster-prone states need
not recreate the wheel. They may follow California’s example, designing
state plans similar to the CEA in order to benefit from the HDA.
Because the plan is voluntary, states could choose to opt in or out of the
program as they see fit. Those states fortunate enough to be less
vulnerable to major natural disasters may choose to implement
alternative methods of coverage for their minimal risk, and taxpayers in
those states will no longer bear responsibility for, at least some, federal
280
disaster relief expenses.
Opponents to the HDA criticize that, if enacted, it will cost the
281
federal government $1.7 billion over the first five years. A Congressional

274. King, supra note 269, at 3–4.
275. Id. at 3.
276. Id. at 5.
277. Id.
278. Hearings, supra note 2, at 11–13.
279. Id. at 14.
280. Orszag & Fontaine, supra note 86, at 24.
281. See, e.g., CBO Releases Score of Homeowners’ Defense Act (H.R. 2555), Nat’l Ass’n of
Prof’l Ins. Agents (June 9, 2010), http://www.pianet.com/NewsCenter/BizPolitics/06-09-10-07.htm
[hereinafter, CBO Releases Score]; see also Arin Greenwood, High Price Tag on Beach House Bailout,
Fire Policy News, Heartland.org (June 21, 2010), http://www.heartland.org/environmentandclimate-
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Budget Office report issued in 2010 supports these figures, estimating
that in the first year of the HDA’s existence, state programs would seek
$7 billion in reinsurance, and opining that the premiums the federal
government would charge for the program will be insufficient to
282
compensate the government fully for the coverage offered. Opponents
have seized upon this report to support the argument that “natural
catastrophe risk should be placed in the insurance market, not on the
283
taxpayers.” However, as discussed above, the taxpayers are already
footing the bill for natural catastrophes. After Hurricane Katrina, the
federal government commenced a bailout that had amassed to $50 billion
284
and counting as of 2008. A more proactive approach may, in fact, save
taxpayer dollars in the long run.
The benefits to all states and consumers, above and beyond those
listed, are manifold and impossible to estimate at this point. One study
285
puts the possible savings to consumers at $11 billion annually. Other
indirect benefits include those from loss-mitigation strategies such as
286
retrofitting, improved land use policies, and stricter building codes. All
told, the savings in every respect will likely be significant. But most
importantly for our purposes, the HDA will help kill two birds with one
stone: Along with the judicial measures I have already discussed,
adoption of the HDA will bulwark the weaknesses in California’s
approach to the concurrent causation question and the problem of
catastrophe insurance, thereby establishing a workable solution for other
states to consider.

news.org/article/27850/CBO_High_Price_Tag_on_Beach_House_Bailout.html. Opponents to the HDA
have dubbed it, colorfully, “the Beach House Bailout.” See, e.g., Greenwood, supra. Like most
political rhetoric, the title is misleading, given that every state in the country, coastal and land-locked
alike, has declared a natural disaster between eight and eighty-four times since 1953. See Annual Major
Disaster Declarations Totals, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011) (providing a list of the number of all natural disasters declared from 1953–2010 in each of the
U.S. states and territories, along with detailed information about the damage incurred). Notably, Oklahoma
ranks third in number of natural disasters during that period, at sixty-six. Id. U.S. natural disasters are
demonstrably not limited to beach front property; rather, a map of presidential disaster declarations
over the last four decades “reflect[s] the broad geographic distribution and human impact of
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanoes and wildfires.” U.S. Geological
Survey, Fact Sheet 2007-3009: National Hazards—A National Threat (2007).
282. Cong. Budget Office, Cost Estimate: H.R. 2555 Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2010 1, 4
(2010).
283. See, e.g., CBO Releases Score, supra note 281.
284. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
285. Id. at 22–23.
286. Id. at 23.
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Conclusion
This Note has examined and proposed a solution to the problems
presented by natural disasters and insurers’ corresponding attempts to
immunize themselves from liability. At the judicial level, the California
courts should strictly curtail the effect of recent cases, such as Julian,
which have undermined California’s approach to concurrent causation.
At the legislative level, Congress should reintroduce and adopt the
Homeowners’ Defense Act of 2009. This approach presents a workable
example for other disaster-prone states and will serve to assuage the
concerns of courts, insurers, taxpayers, and homeowners alike.
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